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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
corporate and politic of 
the State of Utah 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
TERESA JEAN RAMOSELLI, 
Defendant and Respondent.: 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appeal No. 14726 
This Appeal by Salt Lake County arises out of a suit 
commenced by it to condemn the property of the Respondent, 
Teresa J. Rarnoselli (hereinafter called "Rarnoselli" or "Land-
owner") for a claimed public use. The purported aegis of the 
Complaint was the eminent domain laws of this State. 
The issue of public necessity of the proposed expropria~-
tion was contested by Ramoselli and framed, by the pleadinqs~" 
for trial before the District Court. Said matter came on ffH' 
hearing and determination on July 26, 1976. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
After two days of trial, the District Court found from 
a fair preponderance of the evidence; that the County had not 
made a showing of public necessity requisite to acquire the 
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subject property by condemnation, that the testimony at trial 
did not manifest that said property was needed as of March, 
1974, or as of July, 1976, or in the foreseeable future, that 
the county had no defined and adopted plans at all for the use 
of said property, that the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake 
county had not approved or adopted any plans for the utiliza-
tion of the condemned premises, that only the most preliminary 
drawings as to possible and future uses had been recently made, 
that no funds had been budgeted for the use of the Ramoselli 
property aDd there was no showing that funds could be obtained, 
at all, from any source for a possible future use, that the 
evidence manifested a lack of any plans of the County to place 
the Ramoselli property to any general or specific use at any 
defined point in the future; and that under the evidence, the 
proposed use by Salt Lake County of the subject property was 
"uncertain, indefinite and speculative". (R.34-38) 
The trial Court found and concluded that the attempt to 
condemn the Ramoselli property by the County was plainly and 
palpably unreasonable and constituted a clear abuse of legis-
lative discretion. (R.37) Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and an Order dismissing the case were entered by the 
District Court on July 29, 1976. From that Order of Dismissal, 
the County prosecutes this Appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY COUNTY ON APPEAL 
The County requests of this court that it not only reverse 
the District court on the question of public necessity, but 
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that this Court find, as a matter of fact and law, that public 
necessity for condemnation of the Ramoselli land existed in 
March of 1974. 
The County seeks remand of the Case for trial on the 
issue of Just Compensation, assuming arguendo, that the 
question of public necessity has been resolved in its favor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts in the Brief of the County is 
not inaccurate; it is simply incomplete. Such Statement is 
a general recital of the proceedings of trial without any 
account of the evidentiary facts presented to and admitted by 
the trial Court. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 75(p) (2) of 
the Appellate Rules of the Court, the following statement of 
the facts underlying the decision of the lower Court is made: 
l. General Description. 
The property of the Landowner herein consisted of some 
11 acres, having its situs at 6600 South and 9th East in 
Salt Lake County. On March 8, 1974, the County filed suit 
to condemn said property, the alleged public use 'being a 
park and recreation area. (R.5) Ramoselli answered the 
county Complaint denying that there existed the essential 
necessity for the condemnation acquisition and alleging: 
(a) that there was no defined use to which the property 
was to be placed that had been approved or adopted 
by the governing Board of County Commissioners; 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(b) that there was no need for the condemned property 
by the County in the immediately foreseeable future; 
(c) that the proposed use of the land by the County was 
speculative and conjectural; 
(d) that there was no reasonable funding for any con-
templated use of the Ramoselli property, now or in 
the future; 
(e) that the possible use of the land by the County did 
not square with the requirements that the proposed 
use, if any, be so designed as to comport with the 
vreatest public good and the least private injury. 
2. P!f T Gil Planned Use of Property. 
as of llarch 1974, no plans of any defined character relat-
ing ta the possible use of the subject property as a public 
par:k had been submitted to and approved by Salt Lake County. 
(R.111) For that matter, even as of the date of trial in July 
197'~ no defined plans had been adopted or approved by the 
County. (R.112) 
Moreover, the Parks Department, itself, had not approved 
or adopted any plans for the particular use of the Ramoselli 
property as of March 1974, or as of the date of trial. Barely 
18 days before the Case was tried, a preliminary sketch (Exhibit 
P-16) was placed in the hands of the staff of the Parks Depart-
showing a !I (R.153) ment, tentative use of the condemned land. 
Such sketch had only been reviewed by staff and non-policy 
!/ The sketch shows the prospect of a tennis court or two, a parking 
area, walking paths, retention of the present house of Ramoselli 
in which Mrs. Ramoselli and her family presently live and other 
similar possible uses. The trial Court found such tentative 
drawing to be ill-defined, unadopted and conjectural. 
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personnel of the Parks Department and had not even been seen or 
reviewed· by the County Parks and Recreation Commission, much 
less the County Commission. (R.155) 
3. Evidence on Time Frame of Possible Use 
There was no testimony that the County had established a 
time in which the condemned property was to be put to some park 
use. Indeed, the County did not know when, if ever in the 
future, the property of Ramoselli would be put to a .park use. 
(R.162,163) The Wheeler property to the north and east had heen 
acquired through voluntary acquisition by the Parks Department 
in 1970 for an intended public, historical use, but as of eix 
years later, in July of 1976, said property had yet to be plao~ 
to its intended purpose. (R.85-88) The Court was without any 
testimony that the County had any intention to put the subject 
property to any use at any time, immediately or in the future~ 
foreseeable or unforeseeable. (R.163) 
4. Funding for the Possible Use. 
As of March 1974 as well as of the date of trial, tk&re were 
no funds budgeted, appropriated, existent or otherwise a"¥ail-
able from whatever source (public or private) to 'place the coa-
demned property to any present or future use by the CoWl"'Y• ,.~ 
(R.161) While the budget of the County Parks Department had .~ 
been substantially cut in recent years and there was no reasOR 
to believe that a change would take place in Park financing in 
the future (R. 165-166), the Parks Commission was hopeful that 
d b f · d through pos-a use of the condemned property coul e inance 
sible grants from such sources as federal agencies, conservation 
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funds, community development, Housing & Urban Development (HUD), 
and historic funds. (R.150) No applications had ever been 
made for such grants and no commitments had been received 
from any source at any time for the funding of any use of 
tb.e subject land. (R.162) 
The Board of County Commissioners had never given 
approval for the expenditure of any sum for a park or recre-
ational use of the Ramoselli property by the County (R.163) 
and whether it would or would not do so in the future was 
Clllll!11'•l7 aakaown. Thus it was under the testimony of c. c. 
Baugh, Administrator of County Parks: 
Q And that in turn depends upon the availability 
of funds? 
A Yes. 
Q Is that correct? And that in turn depends upon 
the action of the Salt Lake County Board of 
Commissioners which at this time is unknown to 
you? 
A That is right. 
Q Isn't that true? 
A Yes. 
The County had hoped to obtain capital funds for park 
purposes through the issuance of recreational bonds in 1974. 
However, the bond issue was placed before the electorate and 
rejected in that year. (R.160) 
5. The Wheeler Historical Farm. 
It was claimed by the County that the subject property 
was eventually to be made a part of what is ref erred to as the 
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Wheeler Historical Farm. Such is not considered a park or 
recreational use, but rather one of historical significance. 
(R.63,86) Seventy-five acres of property with frontage on both 
6600 South and 900 East had already been acquired through 
voluntary measures by the County in 1970. (R.85,86) No use 
had been made of any consequence for historical or recreational 
purposes on the 75 acres. In fact, it was not until 1976 that 
even marginal use was made of the Wheeler Farm. (R.160) It 
had been leased by the County for several years to private 
interests. 
That the Ramoselli property might be, in part, some day 
used in connection with the Wheeler Historical Farm was not 
even considered by County staff and non-policy personnel until 
1974 after the filing of the condemnation suit herein. (R.111) 
No plans for the subject property to be used in connection with 
the so-called Wheeler Historical Farm had ever been presented 
to or approved by the County Commission. (R.111) The staff of 
county Parks Commission had never developed any design criteria 
to determine whether the Ramoselli property was' necessary to 
the use and operation of the Wheeler Farm theory. (R.103,104) 
6. General Maps of Salt Lake Valley. 
At trial, the County offered several maps suggesting a 
guide for land use patterns and development throughout the 
greater Salt Lake Valley. They were: 
(i) The county Big Cottonwood District Develop-
ment Plan (Exhibit 6-P) was approved in form by the 
county Commission in August of 1973. It, like the 
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other master plans, did not delineate the Ramoselli 
property to be placed to a specific use nor was the 
subject property described in any way by metes and 
bounds. In addition, there was no time frame suggested 
in such planning guide for any development of the 
.Ramoselli property at any time. 
Commissioner Dunn stated the position of the 
Coaunission as to the purpose of the Cottonwood Develop-
ment at the time of its adoption by the County Commission: 
"Commissioner Dunn stated that as he has gone 
tarough this plan, he thinks it is important 
t:lliat the public, as well as the Commissioners, 
.....,. an understandin here that the ado tion 
is plan isn't necessarily the implementation 
Of this plan. It sets forth a goal by which 
certain things can be accomplished if the plan 
is followed, and the metes and bounds that are 
silown in some of these areas as relating to 
green areas, or golf courses or parks or schools, 
etc. may· or may not eventually come about; it 
merely points out a point if they were to have 
their choice of going out and doing everything, 
this is the way they essentially would be done, 
but not necessarily the way it might be ulti-
llllltely done. It is important that the adoption 
of this plan, the basic concept the County 
Commission would be taken would be to approve 
the concept here, but with neither the means or 
ability to necessan.ly implement all of the 
1rograms that are there." (Emphasis added.) 
Exhibit 7-P, p.2) 
(ii) The 1985 Master Plan of Salt Lake County (Exhibit 
2-P). The plan was designed in 1965 and under a color 
code, reflected general land use concepts. (R. 79) The 
Exhibit had nothing to do with the metes and bounds of the 
subject property for particular County use, but rather was 
to serve as a guide for the County Planning and Zoning 
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Commission. (R.79) There had been substantial departures 
from the guideline of Exhibit 2-P in the actual use of 
land throughout the County since its adoption in 1965. 
(R. 80) 
(iii) The County Recreation and Parks Master Plan of 
1972 (Exhibit 4-P) was a general study containing recom-
mendations regarding property use. It did 
it was not intended to portray the subject 
Ramoselli by metes and bounds (R.82), and did not de-
... ,.::; 
lineate any use of said property or at any parti0'1ll~ 
in the future. It was of the same lineage as the 1!!9'5 '< 
'•.:; .tr'; ..... 
Master Plan for Salt Lake Valley--a guidepost f~~ ""i.Ji. 
. - ' ti 
and more detailed, intensified study. (R.52) 
7. County Park Procedure. 
It was the position of the County that in the 
of property for parks, it did not normally develop 
particularized plans for the use of 
establish a time of usage until the property was 
acquired. (R.149) It was claimed that it would 
time and effort to lay-out plans for particular use of 
erty until that property had been actually purchased. 
Such was the accustomed procedure, at least, when the 
Parks Commission was involved in a voluntary acquisition of 
property. (R.85,86) 
FINDINGS OF THE COURT 
The District court, found, upon the close of the evidence 
and argument that a specific use of the Ramoselli property was 
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not and still had not been defined by the Board of County 
commissioners, that there was no showing of any intended use of 
the property for any intended purpose in the immediately fore-
seeable future, that the County had not shown that it was 
financially capable of placing the property to any park or 
recreational use, that its drawings were of a preliminary 
nature only and related to possible and future uses which were 
unapproved by the Parks and Recreation Department and the Board 
of county Commissioners, and that the use by Salt Lake County 
of the Ramoselli premises was uncertain, indefinite, and 
speculative. (R.37) It found that there was no showing of 
public need of the condemned property in the reasonably fore-
seeable future and that under the evidence, the attempted 
condemnation was plainly and palpably unreasonable and con-
stituted a "clear abuse of legislative discretion". (R.37) 
An Order of Dismissal of the Case was thereupon entered by 
the trial Court on July 29, 1976. 
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A R G U M E N T 
POINT I. 
THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC NECESSITY IS PLAINLY 
JUSTICIABLE IN THIS CASE AND THE COUNTY MUST 
AND DID FAIL IN ITS ATTEMPT TO CONDEMN THE 
RAMOSELLI PROPERTY WHERE THE EVIDENCE 
DEMONSTRATES THAT THE ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC 
NECESSITY HAVE NOT BEEN MET. 
1. The Issue of Public Need is Properly Before this court. 
The law of this jurisdiction has long stood for the propo-
sition that whether an attempted expropriation of private land 
by a political subdivision of government is accompanied by a 
showing of public necessity, is a justiciable question properly 
before the Court. Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching 
Co., 18 U.2d 276, 421 P.2d 504 (1966); Bertagnole, et al v. 
Baker, 117 Utah 348, 215 P.2d 626 (1950); Tanner v. Provo 
Bench Canal Irr. Co., 40 Utah 105, 121 Pac. 584 (1911); Utah 
Copper Co. v. Montana Bingham Consolidated Mining Co., 64 Utah 
423, 255 Pac. 672 (1927). All of the factors t~at go into the 
make-up of public need of the condemnation acquisition may be 
raised by the Landowner before the Court in defense against the 
acquisition. 
The position of the County, in Point II of its Brief, 
augers against such legal precept. Therein, it contends that 
a resolution of the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake County 
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to condemn the property of this Landowner is all but disposi-
ti ve of every issue, except the amount of compensation to be 
paid for the expropriation , and that the presumption of the 
regularity and appropriateness of the taking, once determined 
by the condemner, places the issue of necessity beyond the 
factual reach of the condemnee. The County relies upon a u. s. 
Supreme Court decision and the Treatise, Nichols on Eminent 
Domain, for such claim (see page 8 of its Brief). 
The County is misled in its contention. To begin with, a 
decision of the u. S. Supreme Court on the federal substantive 
law of eminent domain has no sphere of influence before this 
Court in this Case; federal eminent domain proceedings have a 
setting that are legally and factually distinct and inapposite 
to the statutory process of condemnation extant in the State of 
Utah. Moreover, while we have no quarrel with the observation 
quoted from Nichols that judicial review on the question of 
public need is directed to particular aspects of the admin-
istrative decision by the public agency to condemn, the quo-
tation in the County's Brief ignores the more definitive 
statement in Nichols under the same paragraph that: 
"In every case, therefore, there is a judi-
cial question whether the taking is of such a 
nature that it is or may be founded on a public 
necessity." l Nichols on Eminent Domain, §4.11 
[2) p. 4-157. 
The fact is that the County, in the case at hand, is con-
fronted with a statute that confers upon District Court juris-
diction to ultimately resolve the question of public necessity 
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when that matter is placed in issue. 78-34-4 U.C.A. of the 
Eminent Domain Code declares, in part: 
"Conditions precedent to taking - before 
property can be taken it must appear: 
* * * (2) That the taking is necessary to such 
* * *. " (Emphasis added) 
Furthermore, 78-34-5, u.c.A. 1953 charges that when 
property is taken for public use, the project "must be 
located in a manner which will be most compatible with the 
greatest public good and the least private injury". Such 
statutory provisos, although not cited by the County in its 
Brief, are not a mere penmanship exercise or an abstract 
vacuum without meaning. Rather, such legislation bestows 
upon the judiciary the full throat to determine whether an 
attempted condemnation expropriation is buttressed by public 
need. Such issue, accordingly, had proper standing before 
the District Court in this Case. 
2. The Elementary Factors of Public Necessity. 
The lower Court proceeded in this Case on the premise that 
the Resolution (Exhibit 1-P) of the County to condemn the 
Ramoselli property was presumptively valid and that such 
determination would not be set aside unless the evidence 
manifested fraud, bad faith, or a clear abuse of discretion on 
the part of the condemning agency. (R.49) That axiom is in 
accord with the controlling case precedent in this jurisdic-
tion, Ogden City v. Stephens, 21 U.2d 336, 445 P.2d 703 
(1968), and was unremarkable. The principle was never the 
-13-
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r 
subject of contest on the part of Ramoselli herein; indeed, the 
Landowner supported the concept. 
Ramoselli made no claim in this Cause that the condemna-
tion suit was spawned on the winds of fraud or bad faith. 
Rather, the position of this Landowner was fastened to the 
precept that the attempted condemnation of the subject property 
by the County in this Proceeding was so fraught with conjecture 
and speculation as to planning and time of use and so afflicted 
by the lack of any rational basis that park use of the Ramoselli 
land wotild ever be realized, that fair minded men could only 
conclude tlwlt the County had manifestly abused its discretion 
in instituting this action. 
There are several criteria which, at a minimum, must be 
met by the condemning body to satisfy the test of public need. 
To begin with, the principle for the use of the property must 
be spelled out by the condemner with specificity. City of 
Helena v. Dewolf, 508 P.2d 122 (Mont. 1973). That is not to 
say that every square foot of the proposed project must be 
2/ 
designed and described with infinite precision.- But it does 
mean that the condemning body cannot, as it did in this Case, 
walk into the courtroom with a cavalier sketch, (Exhibit P-16) 
of a possible use of a citizen's property which had been 
~ However, as generally noticed through hundreds of condemnation suits 
brought in this State, many of which have been before this Honorable 
Court, in practically every suit (whether for highway, school, or 
reservoir purposes) the project use has been designed and redesigned 
over several years with great care and detail, encompassing right-of-
way drawings, engineering plans, and working drawings, as well as 
specifications. 
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prepared bearly 18 days before the time of trial, which had not 
been reviewed much less approved by the County Parks Commis-
sion, and which had not been seen, approved, or adopted, even 
in concept, by the governing Board of Commissioners of Salt 
Lake County. How, we would query, is the County to determine 
whether the property of Rarnoselli is needed for the public use 
until reasonably defined plans are developed, reviewed, approved, 
and adopted, which dictate that need? The question provides its 
own answer. 
Secondly, there must be a showing that the property of 
the Landowner is required for the public use at the time of 
condemnation or at the latest, in the reasonably irnrnediate 
future. Necessity, by inherent definition, implies a known and 
defined date of usage. The overwhelming body of case law, 
uncontroverted by the County in its Brief, is to the effect 
that the governmental body is bound to show a need of the con-
demned property of either present or near future proportions, 
as a condition precedent to the expropriation. State Biqhway 
Board v. Pratt, 250 A.2d 726 (Vt. 1969). As stated by the 
Supreme Court of Michigan in Board of Education v. Baczewski, 
340 Mich. 265, 65 N.W.2d 810: 
"In condemnation proceedings in this State 
petitioner should prove that the property will 
either be immediately used for the purP<;>se.for 
which it is sought to be condemned or within a 
period of time that the jury determines to be 
the near future or a reasonably immediate use." 
(Emphasis added) • 
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Nichols, in his work on Eminent Domain, describes an 
attempt to condemn property for a use, the time of which 
is open and undefined, as naked "speculation and conjecture" 
and cannot be sustained. 1 Nichols ~Eminent Domain, §4.11, 
p. 4-211 (3rd Ed.). Necessity in eminent domain, is that 
which exists "now or in the near future". Nichols on 
Eminent Domain, Ibid. 
Thirdly, a showing is required that the proposed use is 
reasonably capable of being realized and if the evidence 
re!!!J.• that there is no economic basis for funding of the 
prcpiwei• uae, the condemnation complaint must fail. Winegar, 
School Board, et al v. Aires, 371 Pa. 242, 89 A.2d 521 (1952). 
In fiDdiDg that public necessity did not exist under a 
Montana statute similar to that of 78-34-4(2) U.C.A., the 
Montana Supreme Court stated in City of Helena v. Dewolf, 
supra: 
"The burden of demonstrating necessity rests 
upon the condemnor who must establish a prima 
facie case to justify the taking. * * * 
"We conclude that 'necessity' must be 
shown as a reasonable need with foreseeable 
ability to complete. Under the facts of 
this case we do not find a showing of reason-
ably foreseeable ability to complete. Defen-
dants' going business would be destroyed, the 
property acquired, and simply held for that 
indefinite future when it just might be needed. 
* * *." (Emphasis ours) 
We do not argue that the County is under a mandate to 
show that its pockets are laden with coin of the realm so as 
to instantaneously bankroll all facets of the proposed use 
herein. But it was submitted to the trial Court and we do 
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maintain that there must be some plausible manifestation that 
the proposed use is susceptible of capital funding from a 
known source at the time of condemnation or in the reasonably 
immediate future. Elsewise, the whole system of property 
rights in this country, so fundamental to the entire social 
order, would be open game for the ambitious and future schemes 
of a government empire building. The Government is proscribed 
from engaging in land "speculation" by the narrow and strictly 
construed power to condemn a citizen's property. Moyle, et al 
v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 201, 176 P.2d 882 (1947); 
Bertagnole, et al v. Baker, supra. 
POINT II. 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF OF EVIDENCING PUBLIC 
NECESSITY TO WARRANT THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN RESTS WITH THE CONDEMNOR, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. 
This Court is committed to the proposition that the 
burden of proving public necessity in condemnation rests with 
that party who seeks to exercise the power. In Tanner v. 
Provo Bench Canal & Irr. co., supra, this Court, writing 
through Frick, c. J., stated the rule to be: 
"The burden of showing necessity and public 
use is upon petitioner. The burden showing th~ 
11 damages which the owner will suffer rests on him. 
See also Monetaire Mining co. v. Columbus Rexall Consol. 
Mines Co., 53 Utah 413, 174 Pac. 172 (1918) 
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we would not debate the concept that the resolution of 
condemnation adopted by the public agency creates, in most 
circumstances, an evidentiary presumption in favor of the 
power to condemn. But that presumption is rebuttable, and 
when rebutted by competent evidence to the contrary on the 
issue of public necessity (as was the occasion in the Case 
at hand), the power to condemn is jeopardized if the condemn-
ing body does not fulfill it burden of proof on the issue of 
public necessity as defined by law. 
'file failing of the County herein to demonstrate, under 
the requisite principles of public necessity as set out in 
Point I of this Brief, public necessity for the Ramoselli 
property presently or in the immediate foreseeable future, 
required that the District Court dismiss the Complaint here-
in. Such dismissal was entered and is to be affirmed on 
review. 
POINT III. 
THE COUNTY FAILED TO MANIFEST AT TRIAL 
ANY DEFINED USE OF THE RAMOSELLI PROPERTY 
PRESENTLY OR IN THE REASONABLY IMMEDIATE FUTURE. 
It does not take a divining rod to ascertain the basis 
of the Findings of the lower Court that the Complaint of the 
County be dismissed for failure to show public need of the 
Ramoselli property. The insipid and ephemeral evidence 
submitted on the question by the Plaintiff made the 
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conclusion inescapable that the statutory mandate and decisional 
precedent of this Jurisdiction on public necessity had not 
been proven. It was not even a close call. 
First, as to any plans for a proposed use of the condemned 
property, the short and simple answer is that there were no 
plans. The best shot of the County in that regard was in 
the form of Exhibit 16-P. While the property was being tested 
as of the date of condemnation in March of 1974, 16-P was 
prepared barely two weeks before the date of trial in late 
July of 1976. The Exhibit had only been seen by staff and 
non-policy personnel of the Parks Commission. No one in a 
policy position even at Parks Commision level had given ap-
proval to it. The governing Board of County Commissioners 
knew nothing of it, whatsoever, and ~ fortiori, 16-P had 
never been approved or adopted. It was admitted in evidence 
as a "preliminary sketch" of a possible use of the Rarnoselli 
property for park purposes. A casual survey of 16-P prompts 
the conclusion that the drawing could have been constructed 
by an ordinary layman inside of an hour. The Exhibit does 
not begin to rise to the quantum and quality of proof so 
essential to an ascertainment of public need. 
But the disease in the County's case did not stop there. 
It is uncontested that even were it assumed, for the sheer 
sake of argument, the existence of a defined and reasonably 
articulated plans for park use of the Rarnoselli property, 
the County had no notion, at all, as to the time when any 
possible use would be realized. It was not a question of 
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the use being in the future of 2 years or of the remote 
future of 5, 10, or 25 years, it was, rather, the evidence 
before the trial Court that there was no time established at 
all. It is not surprising that under that set of facts, the 
District Court found that any use of the subject property by 
the county was idle speculation and conjecture. 
The lack of a funding source to achieve any possible 
use of the condemned property, whether that use be specu-
lative or real, was the final flaw in the County's position 
before tbe trial Court. This was not a case that the capital 
funding, while not available eo instanti, would be forthcoming 
from the County Co11UI1ission in due course. It was not even a 
case that the capital funding would be available from the 
County Commission in the distant or remote future. Rather, 
the testimony before the trial Court was that there were no 
monies available at all, that the budgets of the County 
Parks Commission had been cut in recent years and the Parks 
Department would have to embark upon a search for possible 
federal grant funds or private, philanthropic donations to 
underwrite any park use of the Ramoselli property. The 
issue of adequate capital funding, standing alone, might not 
be sufficient to deny in every instance, the entitlement to 
condemn herein. But taken with the plethora of testimony 
herein on the lack of any defined use along with the absence 
of any time of usage, the evidence on the total void of fund-
ing merely confirmed the fact that the attempt to acquire 
-20-
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the Ramoselli property by condemnation was nothing more than 
fanciful speculation by the County and was destined to 
failure. 
1. Other Maps and Master Plans Introduced by the county. 
In an attempt to avert the shortfall of the County's 
position on public need in this case, it introduced three 
general master plans of Salt Lake County, or parts thereof. 
Such drawings provided no panacea whatsoever to avoid the 
result reached by the lower Court. The 1985 plan of Salt 
Lake Valley (Exhibit 2-P) and the County Parks Master Plan 
of 1972 (Exhibit 4-P) were admitted as nothing more than a 
general guide-on to further, future, and more particularized, 
specific planning. Those generalized drawings are theoreti-
cal in character only and are without weight in the deci-
sional process of public necessity in this Case. The County 
cannot, in this Proceeding, brace itself on the element of 
public need by using a 1985 and 1972 conceptual plans for 
Salt Lake Valley as a crutch. The County cites no case 
precedent in which such general, theoretical concepts have 
ever formed the basis to condemn specific property. 
The same fate is in store for Exhibit 6-P, offered by 
the County as the Big Cottonwood District Development Plan. 
It, too, was a guide for future consideration of more parti-
cularized planning and in no way cures the defect in the 
showing of public need herein. County Commissioner, 
Dunn, in Exhibit 7-P, stated on the record, when the con-
cept of 6-P was adopted, that such adoption was not "the 
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implementation" of the Plan, but merely "set forth a goal 
***if the plan is followed", and that the areas relating 
to "golf courses, or parks or schools, etc., may or may not 
eventually come about". Commissioner Dunn concluded with a 
statement that such a plan as 6-P was conceptual only and 
that the County had "neither the means nor the availability 
to necessarily implement all of the programs" therein. 
The theoretical Master Plan concepts were unentitled to 
any weight in the decisional process on the question of 
public necessity to condemn the particular property of 
Raee8eJli llerein. 
2. Claimed Procedure for Land Acqt:,isition by the County 
Parks Commission. 
~be County attempted to justify the absence of any 
reasonably defined plans for the possible use of the Ramoselli 
property presently or in the immediate foreseeable future, 
on the lament that the normal operating procedure of the 
Parks Commission is to first acquire property and then 
prepare plans for its ensuing utilization. It claims that 
adequately defined plans, target date for use, and funding 
sources would be futile until the Parks Commission was 
assured that the property was secure. With regard to the 
wisdom (or lack thereof) of Park Commission procedure in 
acquiring, by voluntary purchase, private property and only 
then laying plans for the use of such voluntarily acquired 
property, we make no comment. But as to that property which 
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the County seeks to acquire involuntarily by force of the 
eminent domain power, the answer is swift. The County is 
unentitled to condemn the property of a citizen and there-
after to sit in the councils of government and decide how, 
when, and if that property is to be used. Such conduct, as 
evidenced in this Cause, is nothing short of rank land 
speculation, is the antithesis of the fundamental system of 
property rights in this Country, and constitutes a clear 
abuse of discretion on the part of the Plaintiff herein. No 
other public agency of Government has been heard or forced 
to make such an argument before this Court. 
POINT IV 
THE COUNTY PARKS COMMISSION IS UNENTITLED 
TO CONDEMN PROPERTY FOR A USE IN THE 
UNDEFINED FUTURE. 
The County is heard to contend in Point IV of its 
Brief, p. 17, that the Parks Commission of Salt Lake County 
is entitled to condemn property for future use. ,Cases are 
cited from other jurisdictions suggesting that the property 
may be acquired for future use up to 15 or 20 years from the 
date of taking. However, no decisions of this Court are 
cited for such a sweeping proposition; ~ndeed, that is not 
the law of the case in this State, either by decision or 
statute. 
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78-34-4(2) u.c.A. is the litmus test for public need 
and that, as shown by the overwhelming weight of authority, 
requires a showing of use at the present or in the immediate 
foreseeable future. (See authorities and discussion set out 
in Point I, page 11 of this Brief). 
The County has no inherent power to condemn a citizen's 
property. The genesis of its authority to so do is one of 
plenary delegation from the Sovereign, and that delegation 
is strictly and narrowly construed against the political 
subdivision. Bertagnole, et al v. Baker, supra~ Moyle v. 
Salt Lake City, supra. 
The acquisition of private property for a future use 
being one of legislative delegation, the only agency which 
has been granted the authority by the Utah Legislature to 
condemn for a future purpose is the State Road Commission 
(now the Utah Department of Transportation). Under 27-11-9 
U.C.A. 1963, the State Road Commission is authorized: 
"to acquire any real property or interest 
therein deemed necessary for temporary, 
present, or reasonable future state high-
way purpose by * * * condemnation * * *·" 
(Emphasis added). 
There has been and is no parallel or companion legislation 
authorizing Salt Lake County to condemn for park usage in 
the "reasonable future" much the less the undefined future 
(under the evidence of this case) and the County has not 
referred this Court to any such Statute in its Brief. The 
argument of Salt Lake County on this score thus falls of its 
own weight. 
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POINT V. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE AND WILL NOT BE OVERTURNED BY THIS 
COURT ON APPELLATE REVIEW. 
The Findings, Conclusions, and Order of the District 
Court in this matter are presumptively correct and so long 
as there is competent evidence to sustain the same, those 
Findings and Order will not be overturned on appeal. Schluter 
v. Summit County and Town of Kamas, 25 U.2d 257, 480 P.2d 
140 (1971); Petty v. Gindy Mfg., Corp., 17 U.2d 32, 404 P.2d 
30 (1965); Burton v. Z.C.M.I., 122 Utah 360, 249 P.2d 514 (1952). 
Such rule of appellate review is so well accepted in the 
decisions of this Court that citations of authority become 
unnecessary. 
Yet it is the position of the County that the Court, in 
this appeal, should reverse the District Court on the facts, 
enter Findings of its own on the question of public necessity, 
and then remand the case to the lower Court for a' determina-
tion of Just Compensation. Not only does such argument 
ignore the heavy weight of the decisional precedent of this 
Court as to its function in the appellate process, it also 
ignores the constitutional and statutory mandate that this 
Court will not sit as the trier of fact and overturn the 
Findings of the court of original jurisdiction where they 
are based upon competent evidence. Article VIII, Section 9, 
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Utah state Constitution; 78-2-1 U.C.A. 1953 as amended. The 
Findings, Conclusion, and Order of Dismissal of the District 
court, are supported by competent and substantial evidence, 
and should be affirmed herein. 
C 0 N C L U S I 0 N 
The appeal of the County must fail. The District 
court, upon receipt of all of the evidence, expressly entered 
Filldi.nt9 of Fact and Conclusions of Law that the County, in 
its attempt to condemn the property of Ramoselli, had clearly 
abaaell its discretion. That determination·was bottomed upon 
the f1!1rther findings that the County had failed to approve 
and adopt reasonably defined plans for the use of the subject 
property, that only a preliminary sketch for a possible use 
had been submitted to the staff of the County Parks Commis-
sion, that the time for use was plainly undefined, specu-
lative, and conjectural and that the County had not manifested 
that it was capable of obtaining capital funding for any use 
of the Ramoselli property at any time in the future. Under 
the attendant facts of this Case, a result other than that 
of the trial Court would have invited open and unharnessed 
land speculation by the County Parks Commission. 
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The Findings, Conclusions, and Order of Dismissal, are 
supported by competent and substantial evidence and should 
be affirmed in this review. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
of and for 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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